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THE NEW SOFrWOOD LUMBER
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA: FINALLY
SEEING THE FOREST INSTEAD OF
MERELY THE TREES (?)
R. Shane Sillivent*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE United States and Canada have been bickering about soft-
wood lumber for some time now.1 The U.S. lumber industry
claims that the Canadian lumber industry is unfairly subsidized
and that the Canadian firms' pricing of softwood lumber sold in the U.S.
market constitutes illegal dumping. 2 After considering that the United
States and Canada are the world's two most active trading partners,
3 it
should come as no surprise that the stakes involved in this trade dispute
are significant., For example, $8.5 billion worth of lumber is exported
from Canada into the United States each year, 4 over 7,280,000 jobs in
U.S. and Canadian lumber-related industries are affected, 5 and $5.3 bil-
lion in duties has been collected from Canadian lumber companies by the
U.S. government.since May 2002.6 Because of these high stakes and the
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; B.A.,
University of Texas at Austin.
1. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Export and Import Controls,
Softwood Lumber: Learn More, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/eicb/softwood/
background-en.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
The history of Canada's softwood lumber disputes with the United States
is a long one. The first skirmishes date back to disagreements between
New Brunswick and Maine in the 1820s. The issue of lumber also figured
prominently when the U.S. House of Representatives considered a reci-
procity treaty with Canada in 1853, as well as in later disagreements
throughout the late 1800s and 1900s. Id.
2. See generally Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, Issue Background: Canadian
Lumber Is Heavily Subsidized and Unfairly Displaces U.S. Manufacturing, http://
www.fairlumbercoalition.org/general.cfm?page=12 (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
3. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Export and Import Controls,
Softwood Lumber, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/intro-en.asp (last
visited Sept. 16, 2007).
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Softwood Deal Could Reach Commons Next Week, CTV NEws, Sept. 13, 2006,
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060913/soft-
woodemerson_060913/20060913/.
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persistent volatility caused by over twenty years of contentious litigation,
all interested parties are very anxious to see whether a new softwood
lumber agreement signed on September 12, 2006, and effective since Oc-
tober 12, 2006, will finally provide a durable economic model and a
framework for -communication that is able to prevent future impasse.7
This note first explains the basics of U.S. countervailing duty and an-
tidumping law, which are needed to understand the accusations made
against the Canadian lumber industry. It then briefly surveys the history
of the U.S.-Canadian softwood lumber dispute in order to delineate the
reoccurring problems that have defeated past conciliatory efforts and to
predict whether the new agreement will ultimately avoid such pitfalls. Fi-
nally, it examines the new U.S.-Canadian Softwood Lumber Agreement,
the Canadian-administered export tax/quota system that it adopts, and a
disagreement that has already arisen under the new agreement.
II. U.S. COUNTERVAILING DUTY AND ANTIDUMPING LAW
In the age of globalization, when domestic products must regularly
compete with foreign goods, the legal measures taken to ensure equitable
trade between international partners assume paramount importance. 8
Particularly in regard to distortions in the U.S. market caused by imports
that have been unfairly subsidized or that are being sold for prices below
their fair value, the most vital safeguards available for equalizing compet-
itive conditions are countervailing duties and antidumping tariffs, respec-
tively.9 The legal doctrines that define countervailable subsidies and
unfair pricing provide the background necessary to understand the U.S.-
Canadian softwood lumber dispute.
A. COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
A countervailing duty is a tariff imposed on subsidized imports that is
designed to even the playing field between domestic and foreign produc-
ers. 10 A subsidy is a government conferral of economic benefits "such as
direct cash payments, credits against taxes, [or] loans at terms that do not
reflect market conditions" that assists a business or industry in producing
its goods.11 The general U.S. rule used to determine whether counter-
7. See, e.g., Emerson and U.S. Counterpart Ink Softwood Deal, CTV NEWS, Sept. 12,
2006, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060911/softwood_
deal_060912?sname=_noads=; Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab Announces Entry into
Force of U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.
ustr.gov/Document-Library/SectionIndex.html (search "U.S.-Canada Softwood
Lumber" in "Press Releases" category).
8. JOSEPH E. PATTISON, 1 ANTIDUMPING & COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS § 1:1
(West 2007).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 1:6.
11. International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, An Introduc-
tion to U.S. Trade Remedies, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/intro/index.html (last visited
Sept. 16, 2007); 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties § 135 (West 2007).
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vailing duties should be imposed is that if the U.S. Department of Com-
merce (DOC) establishes that a government is providing a financial
benefit that assists a specific business or industry in producing goods that
are exported to the United States, and if the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) determines that the exports cause material injury to
or prevent the establishment of a domestic U.S. industry, then a counter-
vailing duty will be charged on the foreign goods to level the playing
field.'2
The first part of the general U.S. countervailing duty rule dictates that
only those subsidies that are granted to a specific business or industry
13
that produces goods that are sold in the United States 14 are countervail-
able. To honor the "specificity" requirement, the DOC applies a complex
set of criteria in order "to differentiate between those subsidies that dis-
tort trade by aiding a specific company or industry, and those that benefit
society generally, such as the police, fire protection, roads and schools,
and thus minimally distort trade, if at all."115 The seemingly obvious stip-
ulation that the subsidies must go to firms that produce goods that will be
exported to the United States actually accentuates the point that the very
purpose of countervailing duties is to offset only those "unfair competi-
tive advantage[s] a foreign producer [has] in selling in the American mar-
ket [due to] that producer's government in effect assum[ing] part of the
producer's expenses of selling [in the United States]."1 6 In any case, de
minimis subsidies are not countervailable under DOC policy.1
7
The second part of the general U.S. countervailing duty rule requires
the ITC to determine whether the imports caused material injury to a
U.S. industry.18 To make this determination, the ITC first compares the
imports with domestic products in order to identify the domestic indus-
tries that are potentially affected.1 9 Then the ITC determines whether
any of the potentially affected domestic industries are in fact materially
injured by the subsidized imports.20 Finally, the ITC evaluates the causal
nexus between the imports and the material injury by considering the
volume of imports and their effect on U.S. prices and producers. 21 It
should be noted that the ITC is granted "considerable discretion" in its
12. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2000). See also 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties
§§ 135-44.
13. 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties § 141.
14. See id. § 136.
15. Id. § 141.
16. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 25
C.J.S. Customs Duties § 136.
17. PArISON, supra note 8, §§ 6:4, 6:7 (explaining that the DOC adheres "to a policy
of declining import relief when an investigation reveals that the action targeted by
a petitioner is de minimis" and that "[s]uch a policy ... seeks to . . .conserve
administration and enforcement resources when it is believed that the benefit to be
gained does not justify the expenditure of those resources").
18. 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties § 143.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 144.
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analysis and that it generally considers all relevant economic factors
rather than isolating one single determinative factor.22 To summarize, if
the DOC determines that a countervailable subsidy has been specifically
granted to an industry that exports its goods into the U.S. market, and if
the ITC determines that the subsidized imports caused material injury to
a U.S. industry, then a countervailing duty will be levied to even the play-
ing field.
B. ANTIDUMPING LAW
In addition to the imposition of countervailing duties, a domestic pro-
ducer that believes foreign imports are being sold at unfair prices may
petition for the imposition of antidumping duties. One court has ex-
plained that "[t]he act of selling imports at less than fair market value is
called 'dumping."' 23 Dumping occurs when producers sell their goods in
another country's markets at lower prices than what they charge under
similar conditions of sale in their own country.24 Producers practice this
form of price discrimination because it allows them to maximize their
volume of production regardless of market demand, minimize their pro-
duction cost per unit, and ultimately maximize their profit.25 The general
U.S. rule for determining whether antidumping duties should be used to
counteract the unfair competitive advantage gained through international
price discrimination is that if the DOC determines that foreign goods are
being sold in the United States at less than their fair value, and if the ITC
determines that a U.S. industry is materially injured as a result, then an
antidumping duty equal to the excess of the price charged in the United
States over the price charged in the foreign market will be imposed on
the dumped goods.26
The first part of the general U.S. antidumping rule stipulates that the
DOC must determine whether the foreign goods are being sold for less
than their fair value in the U.S. market. 27 To make this determination,
the DOC must compare the price of the goods in their home market with
their price in the U.S. market, and if the former price is higher than the
latter, then the excess is referred to as the dumping margin.28 This dump-
ing margin is what the antidumping duties are designed to counteract.29
When conducting this comparison, the DOC considers the respective
prices at the same level of trade and time of sale to ensure that the com-
parison is as accurate and fair as possible. 30
22. Id.
23. U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 96 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
24. PATISON, supra note 8, § 1:2.
25. See id. § 1:5.
26. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000); see also 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties § 148(citing Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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The second part of the general U.S. antidumping rule stipulates that
the ITC must determine whether the dumped goods materially injure or
threaten to injure a U.S. industry.3 1 There must be findings of both mate-
rial injury and causation. 32 When making these determinations, the ITC
considers the volume of imports and their effect on U.S. prices and pro-
ducers. 33 It is important to note that the dumped imports need not be
"the sole cause, or even a major cause, of the injury as long as the evi-
dence shows that less than fair value imports are more than a de minimis
factor in contributing to the injury."' 34 To summarize, if the DOC deter-
mines that foreign goods are sold in the United States at less than their
fair value, and if the ITC determines that an industry in the United States
is materially injured as a consequence, then antidumping duties shall be
imposed in order to counteract the harmful effects of such price
discrimination.
III. HISTORY OF THE U.S.-CANADIAN SOFTWOOD
LUMBER DISPUTE
Although the extensive history of softwood lumber disputes between
the United States and Canada actually reaches all the way back into the
early nineteenth century, 35 the modern U.S.-Canadian softwood lumber
dispute refers to the four major cycles of litigation that have occurred
since 1982.36 This latest era of disagreement began when a group of U.S.
softwood lumber producers called the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports
(CFLI) started claiming that the Canadian provincial governments un-
fairly subsidize their domestic lumber industries and that Canadian lum-
ber companies dump their products in the U.S. market at unfair prices.37
According to the CFLI, since the Canadian provincial governments own
most of the timber in Canada, they are able to administratively "set prices
for public timber far below market value, thus lowering production costs
for Canadian lumber companies. ' 38 In addition to providing under-
priced timber, the CFLI also claims that the "Canadian provinces have
instituted policies designed to maximize jobs and production in the Cana-
dian industry-including minimum harvest requirements, domestic
processing mandates, and log export restrictions-resulting in artificially
high timber harvesting and lumber production even when the market is
31. Id. § 151.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 152.
35. Softwood Lumber: Learn More, supra note 1.
36. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Export and Import Controls, Ca-
nada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982-2006), http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/chrono-en.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2007); see also Ca-
nadian Broadcasting Corporation, At Loggerheads: The Canada-U.S. Softwood
Lumber Dispute, http://archives.cbc.ca/300c.asp?id=1-73-787 (last visited Sept. 16,
2007) ("The [U.S.-Canadian softwood lumber] dispute dates back hundreds of
years, but in the 1980s it turned nasty.").
37. See Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982-2006), supra note 36.
38. Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, supra note 2.
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oversupplied," which in turn allows "Canadian companies [to] unload
their excess production into the U.S. market. ' 39 A brief survey of each
cycle of litigation that has arisen out of the modern softwood lumber dis-
pute will allow for a fuller appreciation of the provisions contained within
the new U.S.-Canadian Softwood Lumber Agreement.
A. LUMBER I
The first cycle of litigation during the modern U.S.-Canadian softwood
lumber dispute, Lumber I, was initiated in 1982 when the CFLI peti-
tioned the DOC to impose countervailing duties in order to counteract
the subsidy that was allegedly provided by the Canadian provinces' sys-
tem of granting its timber at administratively-set prices.40 The DOC in-
vestigated the CFLI's allegations, but concluded that any benefit
provided by the Canadian system of setting timber prices (called the
stumpage system) was not directed towards the lumber industry with suf-
ficient specificity and was therefore not countervailable. 4 1
B. LUMBER II
The second modern cycle of litigation, Lumber II, was initiated when
the CFLI again petitioned the DOC for countervailing duties in 1986.42
This time the DOC's preliminary determination was that the provincial
stumpage system did confer a countervailable subsidy to the Canadian
lumber producers, which averaged 15 percent.43 But before counter-
vailing duties were imposed, the United States and Canada entered into a
memorandum of understanding to resolve the dispute.44 The U.S.-Cana-
dian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) rendered the DOC's pre-
liminary determination of a 15 percent countervailable subsidy legally
void, ended the appeals that had already been filed, and adopted a Cana-
dian-administered tariff system, whereby either the Canadian govern-
ment could collect a 15 percent charge on lumber exports or the
provincial governments could increase the stumpage fees they charged
for harvesting their timber and bypass the export charge. 45 Also, in 1989
the United States and Canada entered into a free trade agreement (U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement) that adopted a controversial dispute res-
olution system under chapter 19, whereby countervailing duty and anti-
dumping determinations were subject to binding, bi-national panel re-
39. Id.
40. Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982-2006), supra note 36.
41. Ministry of Forest and Range, Government of British Columbia, Canada-U.S.
Lumber Trade Disputes, http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/het/softwood/disputes.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2007) (explaining that the DOC found that the "stumpage pro-
grams were not countervailable because stumpage was generally available and not
limited to a specific industry (i.e., the specificity test was not met)").
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view.46 This dispute resolution system was controversial because nor-
mally countervailing duty and anti-dumping determinations made by the
DOC were reviewed by the U.S. Court of International Trade, and com-
mentators even suggested that it effectuated an unconstitutional conces-
sion of U.S. sovereignty. 47
C. LUMBER III
After Canada withdrew from the MOU in 1991,48 the third modern
cycle of litigation, Lumber III, began when the "DOC self-initiated a new
countervailing duty investigation" that ultimately concluded that the pro-
vincial stumpage system did confer a countervailable subsidy.4 9 After
this determination, the ITC found that the U.S. market was materially
injured by the subsidized lumber imports, thereby paving the way for the
DOC to impose a 6.51 percent countervailing duty on Canadian softwood
imports. 50 In response, "Canada appealed both final affirmative determi-
nations on subsidy and injury to binational panels established under
Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
(FTA)."''S This led to a flurry of remands adverse to the United States
and a subsequent U.S. appeal to an Extraordinary Challenge Committee
(ECC) under article 1904 of chapter 19 of the FTA.52 After losing the
ECC challenge, the DOC revoked the countervailing duties it had
imposed. 53
In 1996, Lumber III ended when the United States and Canada
reached a five-year trade agreement, which would be their first softwood
lumber agreement (SLA I).54 Under its terms, Canada could export up
to 14.7 billion board feet of its lumber annually to the United States with-
out being charged any tariffs.5 5 But any amount of exported lumber over
14.7 billion board feet would be taxed at "increasingly-prohibitive tariff
rates."' 56 Unfortunately, the SLA I "did not bring the expected five years
of trade peace, '57 and when it expired in 2001, the United States and
46. Id.
47. See generally John R. Magnus, TRADEWINS, LLC, Lumber and the NAFTA
Chapter 19 Mess, Presented to American University, Washington College of Law
Conference (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/
magnuschapter19.pdf (criticizing chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, which was modeled on chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement).
48. Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982-2006), supra note 36
("While keeping these replacement measures in place, Canada exercised its con-






54. Lumber Trade Disputes, supra note 41 ("The consultations led to the negotiation
of the five-year Softwood Lumber Agreement in April 1996.").
55. Id.
56. Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982-2006), supra note 36.
57. Lumber Trade Disputes, supra note 41.
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Canada were unable to agree on a replacement. 58
D. LUMBER IV
Lumber IV commenced immediately after the expiration of the SLA I
in 2001, when the CFLI again petitioned the DOC, this time for both
countervailing and anti-dumping duties. 59 A detailed description of the
complex and voluminous international litigation that followed, which in-
cluded investigations by the DOC and the ITC; subsequent Canadian ap-
peals to North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, the agreement
that superseded the FTA in 1994) chapter 19 binational panels and to the
World Trade Organization (WTO); and U.S. appeals to NAFTA ex-
traordinary challenge committees, is beyond the scope of this note.60 Suf-
fice it to say that the different rulings coming out of the NAFTA and
WTO review systems, sometimes at odds with each other, strained not
only the commercial but also the political relationship between the
United States and Canada. 61 In fact, there were strident calls from
academia and politicians to reassess the utility of the NAFTA dispute
resolution process and even to reassess the continued appeal of the trade
agreement itself.62 Ultimately it became clear to both governments that a
political solution was the only way to solve the puzzle that the litigation in
the NAFTA and WTO venues had caused in the past and was sure to
cause in the foreseeable future. 63 This was the realization that eventually
led to the new softwood lumber agreement.
IV. THE NEW U.S.-CANADIAN SOFTWOOD
LUMBER AGREEMENT
The end of Lumber IV was signaled when the United States and Ca-
nada reached an agreement in principle to resolve the dispute on April
27, 2006.64 On July 1, 2006, the two governments were able to conclude
their negotiations over what had become a new U.S.-Canada Softwood
Lumber Agreement (SLA II).65 On September 12, 2006, the SLA II was
signed by U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab and Canadian Minis-
58. See Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982-2006), supra note 36.
59. Lumber Trade Disputes, supra note 41.
60. See generally Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982-2006), supra
note 36 (discussing the extensive litigation taking place over the last five years).
61. See id.
62. See generally James Graham, Re-evaluation of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism
in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: The Softwood Lumber Dispute, 28 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 473, 473 (1996) (foreshadowing the dangers posed to the
NAFTA dispute resolution process by the "destructive precedent" set under the
FTA).
63. See Emerson and U.S. Counterpart Ink Softwood Deal, supra note 7 (quoting U.S.
Trade Representative Susan Schwab as saying "This is indeed a great day, and a
day that's been a long time coming. We're talking about resolving over 20 years of
litigation.").
64. Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982-2006), supra note 36.
65. Id.
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ter of International Trade David L. Emerson. 66 The SLA II became ef-
fective October 12, 2006.67 Although it is too early to predict if the
framework adopted in this new agreement will be successful enough to
run its full course or even induce renewal at the end of its term (and
thereby succeed where the SLA I failed), a brief examination of the Ca-
nadian-administered regime that the SLA II adopts is necessary to judge
its chances.
A. PRINCIPAL TERMS OF THE SLA II
The SLA II will run "for a term of seven years with an option to renew
for two additional years," 68 even though a termination clause will provide
that "[e]ither party may, at any time after the [SLA II] has been in effect
for eighteen months, terminate the agreement by providing six months'
notice."' 69 Regarding the initiation of any new countervailing or an-
tidumping duties cases, the U.S. government agrees under the terms of
the SLA II to forgo this prerogative and to dismiss any new trade-remedy
petitions.70 Similarly, the United States agrees to forgo the initiation of
any new trade-remedy actions for twelve months after the agreement ex-
pires or is terminated.7 1 Regarding ongoing litigation, both governments
agree to "terminate all litigation before the entry into force of the [SLA
II]. ' '72 Regarding duties collected in the past, the terms of the SLA II will
require the U.S. government to return more than $4.5 billion of the ap-
proximately $5.3 billion collected in countervailing and antidumping du-
ties from the Canadian lumber industry.73 Importantly, disputes relating
to the SLA II will be resolved through a final, binding, neutral, and trans-
parent dispute settlement process, whereby a panel of non-North Ameri-
can commercial arbitrators will resolve any disagreements.
74
The focal point of the SLA II is the Canadian-administered regulatory
regime it adopts. Basically, no export duties will be assessed if lumber
prices are above $355, but if the price dips to or below $355, Canadian
regions will be able to choose between an export duty that varies with
price and a mixed regime consisting of an export duty and an export
quota limit, both varying with price. 75 The SLA II also establishes a
"Surge Mechanism" that first determines an export volume limitation for
66. Emerson and U.S. Counterpart Ink Softwood Deal, supra note 7.
67. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Softwood Lumber, http://www.ustr.gov/
WorldRegions/Americas/Canada/SoftwoodLumber/SectionIndex.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 16, 2007).
68. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Export and Import Controls, The
Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/
softwood/SLA-backgrounder-en.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
69. Id.; see generally Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S.-Can., Sept. 12, 2006, http://
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/pdfs/SLA-en.pdf.
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each Canadian province based on its historic share of the U.S. market
and then stipulates that if a province exceeds its assigned limitation by
110 percent in any month, "the export charge on shipments from that
province during that month will be increased by 50 percent. '76
B. INITIAL CANADIAN REACTION
The immediate Canadian political reaction to the SLA II was mixed:
the agreement garnered support from the conservative Harper govern-
ment but drew harsh criticism from the New Democratic and Liberal po-
litical parties.77  But after the Bloc Quebecois announced its
endorsement, the SLA II passed its first reading in the Canadian House
of Commons with a 172-116 majority. 78 The Canadian lumber industry
has largely viewed the SLA II as the best possible immediate solution, 79
although some producers' refusal to abandon their ongoing litigation
delayed the agreement's taking effect.80 Elliott Feldman, an international
trade attorney and former director at the Canadian-American Business
Council, insists that the deal is "entirely one-sided," that it does not fur-
ther Canada's interest in the least, that its duration is too short to provide
long-term stability in the market, and that "[t]he reason the Canadian
industry has fallen into what's euphemistically being called support for
the agreement is because they have been bled dry[,] [i.e.,] [t]heir profits
for five years have gone into the U.S. treasury.18 1
C. DISAGREEMENT ALREADY
To a large extent, the SLA II's success will depend on whether its pro-
visions provide an effective way to solve disputes before the parties feel
compelled to arbitrate or even terminate the agreement. Unfortunately,
this capability is already being tested. On March 30, 2007, U.S. Trade
Representative Susan Schwab requested formal consultations with Ca-
nada regarding "Canada's application of certain adjustments to export
levels based on differences between expected and actual conditions in the
U.S. market" and regarding "assistance programs maintained by Que-
bec[,] Ontario[,] and the Canadian federal government," which "provide
benefits, such as grants, loans, loan guarantees, and tax credits," to Cana-
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Emerson and U.S. Counterpart Ink Softwood Deal, supra note 7.
78. See Softwood Deal Survives Vote in House of Commons, CTV NEws, Sept. 19,
2006, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060919/softwood_
vote_060919/20060919/ (explaining that "while the NDP and most Liberals voted
against the deal, the separatist Bloc Quebecois threw it[s] support behind the gov-
ernment, allowing the deal smooth passage").
79. See, e.g., Emerson and U.S. Counterpart Ink Softwood Deal, supra note 7.
80. Ottawa Won't Meet Oct. 1 Softwood Deadline, CTV NEws, Sept.27, 2006, http://
www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060927/softwood-deadline_06
0927/20060927?hub=Canada.
81. Emerson and U.S. Counterpart Ink Softwood Deal, supra note 7.
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dian companies. 82 The CFLI "views the request for formal consultations
as a necessary first step to resolving Canada's failure to properly adminis-
ter the surge provision of the agreement, and to address the new subsidy
programs that are inconsistent with the anticircumvention provisions of
the agreement. '83
It is important to point out that these types of disagreements were an-
ticipated by the drafters of the SLA 11.84 For this reason, the SLA II
''contains several mechanisms for exchanging views and clarifying the
terms of its operation," with consultations being "the first step in [a] SLA
dispute settlement process ... designed to... resolve differences short of
arbitration.'85 Despite this design, the United States and Canada were
unable to resolve their disagreement during formal consultations held on
April 19, 2007.86
On August 7, 2007, the United States announced its intention to initiate
arbitration proceedings under the SLA 11.87 Canadian Minister of Inter-
national Trade David Emerson has explained that the formal consulta-
tions did not work because the United States and Canada interpret parts
of the SLA II differently. 88 Emerson has downplayed the effect this early
disagreement will have on Canada's commitment to the SLA 11.89 The
arbitration proceedings will be "conducted under the rules of the London
82. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Requests




83. Peter Morton, Canada Flouts Deal, U.S. Says, FINANCIAL POST, Apr. 2, 2007, http:/
/www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/printedition/story.html?id=9cac7a7l-
2971-40d0-b75e-b07815505acf (quoting CFLI spokesman Zoltan van Heyningen).
84. Id. ('Given the complexity of the agreement, we expected that such administra-
tive issues would arise," [Canadian Trade Minister David Emerson] said. "For this
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V. CONCLUSION
The early failure of the formal consultation process and the resulting
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can come together and realize that cooperation is almost always more
profitable than litigation, then perhaps the United States and Canada will
finally see the forest instead of merely the trees.
90. United States to Request Arbitration Challenging Canada's Implementation of the
2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement, supra note 87.
